In this assignment, I was forced to deviate from my intended plan and discovered there were fascinating areas of inquiry. Two found their way into my visual; one is mentioned, the other explored.

The initial plan was to conduct a retrospective evaluation, on 6 organizations that I have professional connections with, and explore the differences in how a transition from a face-to-face lecture format for recurrent pilot training was replaced by computer based distance education, provided by professional third-party companies. Information was provided on condition of anonymity. I was initially disappointed to learn that each of the companies had a very simple method to institute this change: It was mandated by upper management, and non-compliance on the part of the employees (pilots, in these cases) meant termination. As a result, I would say that Lewin and his “Unfreezing, moving, freezing” (Lewin, 1947, p.34) would seem most suitable, but only because on the surface, it possesses the fewest moving parts.

With such established historical roots in military operational styles, results should not have surprised me as much as it did. Where my fascination arose, was in the vastly different scores that were produced when management, employees, and an impartial observer rated the implementation effect of the distance education. Score range was from “Very Negative” (score -10) through “Neutral” (Score=0) to “Very Positively” (Score +10). In EVERY case, management believed the change was highly positive (avg. +7.5 on a range of -10 to +10) while the employee and observer scores disagreed by as much as 15 points!

These differences, and the variations between organizations caused me to expand my questions to try and understand the gaps. I added a second retrospective question “How would you rate the organizational readiness prior to the implementation?”.  In this case, final scores from all three perspectives were nearly identical, as a result an average of the three perspectives is included, not each perspective.

It is worth noting that some management scores on readiness were initially quite different (again, higher) than the other perspectives; it was only in explaining that the entire organization, not just management/senior leadership, should be considered when they reflected on readiness that the scores matched nearly perfectly. This disconnect alone, the failure to consider readiness from an end-user perspective, likely explains most of the gaps.

 

Where the Lewin model is efficient to mention, it leaves the casual observer to potential oversimplification; a very compelling risk emerges in that a leader could encounter the description and assume it is a simple three step process to implement change. The risks of missing critical nuances in the Lewin approach are explored well in “Kurt Lewin and the planned approach to change: a reappraisal” (Burnes, 2004). Here we understand that this simplification was never intended by Lewin:

Lewin’s Planned approach to change is based on four mutually- reinforcing concepts, namely Field Theory, Group Dynamics, Action Research and the 3-Step model, which are used in combination to bring about effective change. His critics, though, tend to treat these as separate and independent elements of Lewin’s work and, in the main, concentrate on his 3-Step model of change. When seen in isolation, the 3-Step model can be portrayed as simplistic. (Burnes, p. 996)

In this defense of Lewin from a scholarly perspective, I think I see an explanation for why many change management models fail: convenient pieces of them are implemented and critical elements are ignored. As an analogy, I once heard a nutritionist asked which diet is the most effective and her answer was “The one you actually, and completely, stick with.” Had the leadership in the poorly reviewed organizations appreciated “that the change process start with unfreezing the current state of the organization by creating incentives, implementing the desired changes by selecting the right leadership style and ends with refreezing the state when the organizational desired change has been reached.” (Al-Haddad & Kotnour, 2015, p.248), greater effects would likely be achieved.

I’ll note: in every organization I am referencing, there was never formal or systematic plans for organizational change. There was either an ‘instinctive’ consideration for employee perspectives from leadership, or the change was poorly received. In the case where change was well received, luck, rather than educated leadership, appears to be the differentiator.

References:

Al-Haddad, S., & Kotnour, T. (2015). Integrating the organizational change literature: a model for successful change. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 28(2), 234-262.

Burnes, B. (2004). Kurt Lewin and the planned approach to change: a re‐appraisal. Journal of Management studies, 41(6), 977-1002.

Lewin, K. (1947). Frontiers in group dynamics: Concept, method and reality in social science; social equilibria and social change. Human relations, 1(1), 5-41.