Access is key. The pandemic that began in 2020 showed that universal access is needed for students to not only learn, but to avoid learning losses. This especially true in developing countries where access to both healthcare and education has never been equal to more developed countries. In this speculative future, a new world hegemony for education will be outlined that will have gained momentum because of a world pandemic, but that had its roots in a plan that was begun many years before and for which a framework was laid out that awaited only the opportunity to execute it.
2030:
It has been a long decade, and one of the most chaotic in the history of civilization.
The COVID-19 pandemic that started in 2020 was the start of the change for African students. Historically, Africa had been seen by western governments as a source of human and mineral capital to support colonization plans and global wars between various kingdoms. As US influence decreased during and after the pandemic as described in long cycle theory (Harkavy, 1999), China took advantage of western chaos in public health to step into the void and shift African politics from a Euro-centric physical enslavement of Africa to a China-centric technological and ideological one. The distribution of vaccines became the key to improving trust by Africa in China and was the turning point that finally allowed African students the access to technology they have so desperately needed to take a place on the global stage. First, there needed to be room for them to grow into. That came from the west in an unexpected side-effect of democracy.
Social chaos reigned in the democratic west from 2020-2026, with battling factions of pro- and anti- vaccine groups arguing, mostly online for the first couple of years. Their arguments finally spilled over into street riots in many countries in 2026, as well as civil war in some others, with many governments invoking martial law as they ran out of means of dealing with social problems. Overlapping democratic election cycles, often interrupted by periods of martial law, also permitted a rise in nationalistic sentiment that further inflamed conflict in some countries and permitted waves of ever more lethal virus mutations to ravage unvaccinated populations. All this foreground drama occurred against a background of exhausted and ever more quiet public health voices calling for sound scientific decisions to be taken. This also left little money in western university coffers for higher education investments or international student inclusion.
At the same time, China used its quick (Ritchie et al., 2021) vaccine distribution program to stabilize the pandemic domestically. It then doggedly continued its technological expansion by the creation of more affordable educational technology that was distributed along with much-needed vaccines across Africa. Sino-African relations, most importantly the inclusion of African students in Chinese universities, grew exponentially, which followed a trend that was started more than two decades before (Obamba, 2013). The Chinese economy, once estimated to surpass that of the USA by 2028 (BBC, 2020), overtook it in 2025 due to the negative debt ratings incurred by western countries after massive COVID relief spending decimated their budgets. The ability of China to distribute effective vaccines effectively to vulnerable countries in Africa went a long way to discouraging the idea that “China was up to no good” (Kinyondo, 2019). When the COVID-19 pandemic finally burned itself out in the west in 2026, China was well-poised to take an even more dominant role in the tech world and effectively became the only supplier for educational tech such as computers, processing chips, internet servers, leaving western educational institutions reeling from their lack of choices and now second place position as trading partner of choice. China took advantage of this newfound goodwill and international trust and used it to launch the next phase of its two-pronged plan for global educational domination.
The stockpiling of microchips (BBC, 2020 and BBC, 2020a) and development and distribution of internet infrastructure and tablet computers, then the rebuilding of the Confucius Institute program were the two pillars on which China’s African educational expansion plans rested.
After US sanctions were implemented in 2024 during the US election campaign that prevented China from accessing most of the western supply of microchips, China was well-poised to use its influence in Africa to strike contracts to manufacture microchips using African mining and manufacturing infrastructure. This social licence came after its wildly successful vaccine campaign (that also included distribution of the new malaria vaccine (WHO, 2021)). China then used its management role in African mining and manufacturing to help African students gain access to educational technologies like reliable electricity, cellular telephones, and internet access. Increased student attendance in schools occurred both in Africa, as well as by African students in Chinese universities. Since Africa was able to supply raw materials to support Chinese technology manufacturing in exchange for the end-product technology and internet access that students need, previously underserved populations were lifted out of poverty and into the global stage in a meaningful way. The final step came by the redevelopment of the Confucius Institute (CI) program.
China finally gained control over African schools by educating African students using its CI program (Freuda-Kwartang, 2020), which came to include the provision of technology that African students need after it was overhauled. Importantly, this also includes the cultural “propaganda tools” that came with the technology (BBC, 2019). CI predated the COVID-19 pandemic, but the pandemic provided the leverage China needed to be taken more seriously on the global stage. Since the early 21st century, China has used its Confucius Institutes to deliberately expand cultural and economic influence, with varying degrees of success between the developing world and the developed world (Wu, 2018). In response to the opinion that China harbored African colonisation plans (Fredua-Kwarteng , 2020), China got better at discretion. Students in Africa benefitted from Chinese technology provision, but the opacity of the Chinese state’s policies continued to make it difficult to understand the extent of the provision of tech vs. the true cost, which continues into the new decade.
As of late 2030, China continues its play for world education domination through the opportunistic use of African need for education and Chinese need for global acceptance and access to raw materials. The next decade will show China’s true colors as the new African colonizer or not, as a global power successor to the western colonization of Africa that took place through the previous centuries.
References:
BBC, 2019. Confucius Institutes: The growth of China’s controversial cultural branch. (2019, September 6). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-49511231
BBC, 2020. China takes aim at US “bullying” of its tech firms. (2020, September 8). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-54052765
BBC, 2020. Chinese economy to overtake US “by 2028” due to Covid. (2020, December 26). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55454146
BBC, 2020. Huawei: “Survival is the goal” as it stockpiles chips. (2020, September 23). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54266531
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